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Abstract 
 
In India, agriculture is inherently a risky venture due to uncertainty in production and 
volatility in price, and more so in the context of increased climatic aberrations and 
globalisation. Therefore, there is a great need for crop insurance to provide economic support 
to farmers, stabilise farm income, induce farmers to invest in agriculture, reduce indebtedness 
and decrease the need for relief measures in the event of crop failure. This paper assesses the 
performance of the National Agricultural Insurance Scheme, NAIS (area based crop yield 
insurance) and the pilot Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme, WBCIS (area based rainfall 
insurance) under implementation in the state of Odisha, the climate change hot spot of India.  
Analysing secondary time series data on performance of these two schemes and information 
gathered through focussed group discussion with insurance users, the paper concludes that 
WBCIS seems to perform better than NAIS because of higher coverage, larger percentage of 
farmers benefited, lower premium, faster and more frequent compensation payment and more 
transparency. But WBCIS covers only weather related risk and the sum assured and the 
compensation amount are lower.  Therefore, instead of having two schemes, a hybrid product 
combining the advantages of both the schemes should be offered. To increase the penetration 
of insurance in rural areas, insurance companies may be asked to provide priority insurance 
services to farmers just like priority lending to agriculture sector. The public sector may 
address catastrophic risk and provide multi-peril insurance where subsidy requirement is 
high, but allow private sector to provide insurance products for less severe events and for 
individual independent idiosyncratic and localized risk. In the context of climate change with 
increasing agricultural risk, there is a need to redesign insurance products not merely as a risk 
transfer mechanism but as a potent device to reduce risk and crop loss by inducing desirable 
proactive and reactive responses in insurance users. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is a global environmental challenge that is threatening sustainable 
development around the world. It is a continuing long-term process manifesting itself with 
gradual increase in temperature, greater variability in rainfall, rise in sea level and increased 
frequency, intensity and duration of extreme weather events, such as drought, flood, cyclone 
and storm surge (IPCC, 2007). However, the impact of climate change is not uniform across 
all sectors or all regions of the world. The low-latitude tropical countries in South Asia and 
Africa are the worst sufferers because of their heavy dependence on agriculture, which is the 
most climate sensitive sector. Agriculture dependent economies are invariably the low-
income countries and are thus most vulnerable to climate change due to their high exposure 
with least adaptive capacity. Their high levels of susceptibility and low coping capacity have 
been linked to a range of factors that include a high reliance on natural resources, low per 
capita GDP and high poverty, limited ability to adapt financially and institutionally, and a 
lack of safety nets (David and Twyman, 2005). Moreover, the poorest and most vulnerable 
groups within the developing world will disproportionately experience the negative effects of 
21st century climate change owing to their least coping capacity. 
India being located in the low latitude region of South Asia is extremely vulnerable to 
climate change because of its tropical climate, monsoon rain, long coast line, greater 
dependence on agriculture, high incidence of poverty, low irrigation coverage and inadequate 
resources and technology to combat climate change. Agriculture is the dominant sector in 
Indian economy. Agriculture contributes 22 percent of GDP, provides 58 percent of 
employment, sustains 69 percent of population, produces all the food and nutritional 
requirements of the nation, important raw materials for some major industries, and accounts 
for about 14 percent of exports. However, agricultural production is beset with various risk 
factors due to occurrence of natural calamities like flood, drought, cyclone and storm surge, 
infestation of plant diseases and pest attack, technology failure, irregularity in input supply 
etc. Apart from production risk, there is also market/price risk owing to fluctuations in input 
and output prices. Agriculture is inherently a risky venture due to its dependence on climatic 
factors such as rainfall, humidity, sunshine and temperature which are difficult to predict and 
beyond human control. 
Risk in agriculture can thus be considered as an interaction of production risk and 
price risk. Indian agriculture is now confronting two major threats: climate change and 
economic globalization (O Brien et al, 2004). While climate change is accentuating the 
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production risk, globalisation has raised the price fluctuations. The combined effect of these 
two stressors has created a crisis situation in Indian agriculture; as a result farmers’ suicides 
are reported in most of the states indicating the failure of public action in handling the 
aggravated risk situation. However, of all the risk factors in agriculture, weather variables are 
considered to be the most important (Miranda and Vedenov, 2001).  
Climate change has affected production risk in various ways such as: (i) increasing 
the frequency of loss events, (ii) changing absolute and relative variability of losses, (iii) 
shifting spatial distribution of losses, (iv) damage function increasing exponentially with 
weather intensity, (v) abrupt and non-linear changes in losses, (vi) widespread geographical 
simultaneity of losses, (vii) more single events with multiple correlated consequences, (viii) 
more hybrid events with multiple consequences. Thus with climate change, the agricultural 
risk will not only accentuate but also will become very complex and cumbersome process 
necessitating devising new mechanisms and measures to address such risks. 
Government takes many steps such as flood proofing, drought proofing, watershed 
management, extension of irrigation facility, technology development, provision of 
insurance, relief measures etc. to reduce production risk. At the same time farmers take a 
wide variety of adaptive measures including ex-ante measures before the event of crop loss 
and ex-post measures after the crop loss to cope with the production risk associated with 
climatic aberrations. The ex-ante measures mostly aim at smoothing income, whereas the ex-
post measures are mostly consumption smoothing (Morduch, 1995). The income smoothing 
measures include changes in cropping pattern, intercropping, mixed farming and sowing 
drought/flood resistant seeds, increasing irrigation efficiency and income diversification. The 
ex-post measures usually adopted by the farmers after the occurrence of the crop loss are 
drawing down of savings, borrowing, sale of assets and migration. Crop insurance is a coping 
mechanism and ex-ante adaptation measure by which risk is transferred from the insured to 
the insurer. Crop insurance indemnifies the farmer if there is ultimate crop failure in spite of 
all the precautionary measures taken by him. Insurance is a mechanism in which payment of 
a certain small amount of premium ensures the receipt of a larger amount of compensation 
contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain loss event. Thus, insurance involves the 
substitution of a small known cost (premium rate) for the possibility of a larger but uncertain 
loss which will be compensated through indemnification. The basic principle underlying crop 
insurance is that the loss incurred by a few is shared by many in an area. Also, losses incurred 
in bad years are compensated from resources accumulated in good years (Dandekar, 1976). 
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Most of the Indian farmers are having small size of land holding and resource-poor. 
Therefore, they are usually risk averse and in the face of production risk and absence of 
insurance, they manage their farms so as to minimise loss rather than maximising profit. 
Whereas specialisation may lead to efficiency in resource use due to economies of scale, the 
Indian farmers diversify the cropping pattern and occupation to spread risk. This results in 
inefficient allocation of resources and sub-optimal output. Once there is an extreme weather 
event like drought and flood, which are catastrophic and covariate risk affecting all the 
households in the region at same time, the informal risk sharing mechanisms mediated 
through patron-client relationship become inoperative. On the other hand, in many 
developing countries, formal credit and insurance markets are not adequately developed due 
to asymmetric information, moral hazard, adverse selection problems which give rise to high 
transaction and contract enforcement costs. In the absence of any dependable formal credit 
and insurance facility, farmers borrow from informal moneylenders at exorbitant interest 
rates; sell livestock, land and other durable assets and fall into the poverty trap (Barnett et al. 
2008). In such a situation, there is a great need for crop insurance to provide economic 
support to farmers, stabilise their farm income, induce them to invest in agriculture, reduce 
indebtedness and decrease the need for relief measures. It is a better option for a farmer to 
insure his crop and transfer the risk to the insurer rather than waiting for government relief  
after the occurrence of the loss event, which is uncertain.  
Realising the need for crop insurance as a safety net to farmers, Government of India 
has implemented various crop insurance schemes from time to time (AICI, 2007). To 
ameliorate the problems of information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard 
endemic in insurance markets (Goodwin, 2001), India has implemented area based index 
insurance schemes.  Since 1999, National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) has been 
implemented, which is an area based crop yield insurance scheme. However, the performance 
of NAIS is not satisfactory due to its low coverage, poor financial performance and delay in 
indemnity payment (Raju and Chand, 2008). Since 2007, the weather based crop insurance 
scheme (WBCIS) has been launched on pilot basis in several states of India. If there is a 
deficit or surplus in rainfall, the farmers insuring their crop in the defined area get 
compensation. In comparison to crop yield, rainfall as an index is more objective, readily 
available, easily verifiable and reliable. Thus, WBCIS is considered as an improvement over 
NAIS due to its less administrative cost, more transparency and quicker payment of 
compensation (Gine et al. 2008). The major drawback of WBCIS is the basis risk i.e. the 
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mismatch between the actual crop loss suffered by the insurance buyer and the indemnity 
received on the basis of the weather index (Binswanger and Mkhize, 2012). Internationally 
India covers the largest number of farmers under insurance which include more than 22 
million farmers under NAIS and more than 3 million under pilot WBCIS during 2010. 
However, the penetration of insurance is less than 20 per cent of total farming households, 
which is a major concern for the government. 
In the context of climate change, with increase in agricultural risk, the risk averse crop 
producers will require more of insurance coverage at lower cost, while the insurers will have 
a tendency to increase premium rate and reduce coverage. Innovative insurance products 
need to be designed so as to balance the interests of both the insurer and the insured. The 
insurer’s interest lies in the economic viability or profitability of the insurance product, 
whereas the insured is concerned with his ability to pay the premium and the affordability of 
the product. Therefore, both affordability and economic viability criterion need to be 
synergised to offer new insurance products in the climate change scenario. Thus, there is a 
need to redesign insurance products not only as a risk transfer mechanism but more 
importantly as a risk reducing and mitigation measure by inducing desirable proactive and 
reactive responses in the insurance users. 
This paper attempts to compare the area based yield insurance scheme NAIS and the 
rainfall insurance scheme WBCIS under implementation in Odisha, located in Eastern coast 
of India and known as the climate change hot spot for its extreme vulnerability to climate 
induced natural disasters. The paper examines the performance of these two schemes with 
respect to their coverage, operational efficiency and financial performance and above all their 
efficacy and effectiveness in managing risk in the climate change context. The paper uses 
time series, district and region wise data on scheme performance collected from the office of 
the regional office of the Agriculture Insurance Company of India, Bhubaneswar. Also, 
information was collected from insurance users through focussed discussion in the field. The 
objective of the paper is to suggest appropriate insurance policy and schemes for mitigating 
and adapting to climate change risk. The paper is divided into six sections. Section 1 is the 
introductory section emphasizing the increasing role of insurance in the context of climate 
change in India and contains the objectives of the paper. Section 2 reviews existing literature 
on implications of climate change for insurance industry. Section 3 delineates the climate 
change scenario in Odisha and how does it affect agriculture. Section 4 explains the 
operational mechanism of crop insurance schemes under implementation in Odisha. Section 5 
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compares the performance of NAIS with WBCIS. Section 6 contains some policy 
recommendations for revamping the existing insurance schemes in the increasing risky 
environment of changing climate. 
2. Climate Change and Insurance: A Review 
Many studies have been undertaken to examine the implications of climate change for 
insurance industry. Climate change increases agricultural risk by increasing variability in 
rainfall, causing water stress, enhancing susceptibility to plant diseases and pest attack and 
more importantly raising frequency, intensity and duration of extreme weather events like 
drought, flood, cyclone and storm surge. These risks are catastrophic and covariate in nature 
and affect the whole population in the affected area at the same time. Therefore, these 
correlated risks cannot be pooled and pose potential threats to insurance industry. Thus, 
climate change may erode the insurability of many catastrophic risks. Climate change stands 
as a stress test for insurance, the world’s largest industry with U.S. $4.6 trillion in revenues 
(Mills, 2012). While climate change undermines the viability of the insurance industry, it also 
offers enormous opportunities to innovate new insurance products to minimize the causes and 
effects of climate change (Mills, 2007, 2012). Historically the insurance industry had played 
a key role in the establishment of first fire department, enforcement of building construction 
codes and vehicle safety testing.  
With increase in exposure to risk, the insurance company may respond by increasing 
premium, insisting greater deductibles, refusing to insure unless the insureds take risk 
reducing measures, limiting maximum coverage, transferring risks to governments and global 
reinsurers, withdrawing from certain exposures or abandoning the market altogether (Tucker, 
1997; Mills, 2007). Duncan and Myres (2000) in their insurance model show that 
catastrophic risk increases premium, reduces farmer coverage levels, and, under some 
conditions, lead to a complete breakdown of the crop insurance market. Under such 
circumstances, reinsurance can increase participation and it needs to be subsidized. The most 
effective step is to forge public-private partnership and couple insurance schemes with 
explicit measures to prevent disasters. The private sector can play a vital role in climate 
insurance systems for developing countries. 
The major objective of the insurance company is reducing risk to the insurance 
company, i.e. the variability in its income from insurance business. The most effective way to 
reduce risk would be to take action to limit the probability of global warming or reduce its 
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impact. Thus, where insurers tend to retreat in the face of climate change, insurance users will 
encounter acute affordability issues restricting their access to this societal safety net. The 
strategy should be to develop innovative products and systems for delivering insurance and 
use of new technologies and practices that both reduce vulnerability to disaster-related losses 
and support sustainable development (Mills, 2012).  
With increase in the frequency and severity of natural disasters, the need for disaster 
relief will increase manifold. The low-income countries find it difficult to finance economic 
losses in the aftermath of natural disasters out of government budget revenues, due to the 
limited tax base and considerable indebtedness of many of these nations. On the other hand, 
international aid has not been able to keep pace with the growth in demand for natural 
disaster relief. There is clear evidence that over-reliance on these traditional post-disaster 
funding models may no longer be sustainable. There is a need for market based solution for 
addressing such risks. Insurance has to play both adaptive and mitigative role. Mitigation i.e. 
reduction in Green House Gas emission and reducing exposure to risk are more important 
than adaptation. Insurance industry can do this by rewarding those who adopt risk-reducing 
technologies and practices, using financial incentives in the form of lower premiums, 
deductibles and higher sum assured etc. There are other methods as well, such as channelling 
information to insurance customers and promoting improved building codes and land-use 
planning (Mills, 2007). In the long term, insufficient adaptation in areas of rising risk could 
threaten the concept of insurability itself, by limiting the availability and affordability of 
private insurance coverage. Activities that incentivise and enable adaptation not only give 
rise to commercial opportunities, but are increasingly necessary for the sustainability of the 
insurance industry (Herweijer et al, 2009). The insurance industry is likely to face increased 
regulatory scrutiny and action if it does not respond appropriately to the threat of rising 
uninsurability. Forty leading international insurance companies have launched a Climate 
Wise initiative to incorporate climate change in their investment strategy and they have 
agreed to adopt the following activities (Kunreuther et al., 2013). 
• Promote risk awareness and risk-reducing behaviour through risk-based pricing 
• Develop insurance products and/or terms and conditions that incentivise risk 
reduction 
• Finance risk reduction/adaptation measures 
• Risk education 
• Fostering disaster resilience practices and technologies 
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• Establishing relationships with policy-makers, regulators, and the private sector. 
However, many economists (Bayer and Mechler, 2006) are of the view that without 
donor support, insurance is hardly affordable in highly exposed developing countries, which 
helps to explain why only 1% of households and businesses in low-income countries, and 
only 3% in middle-income countries, have catastrophe coverage, compared with 30% in high-
income countries. Climate change is a global phenomenon. The history of high carbon 
growth and high emissions of developed countries has been major contributor to global 
warming. Developing countries are most vulnerable to environmental hazards due to climate 
change and have a low capacity to cope. Therefore, international support for climate risk 
management, including proactive support for insurance instruments, is emerging on the 
climate change adaptation agenda. Article 4.8 of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) calls upon Convention Parties to consider actions, including 
insurance, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing countries arising from the 
adverse impacts of climate change (United Nations, 1992), and Article 3.14 of the Kyoto 
Protocol explicitly calls for consideration of the establishment of insurance policies (United 
Nations, 1997). These interventions include the provision of technical assistance, financial 
subsidies and reinsurance. The Earth system, the global economy and the insurance systems 
constitute a connected complex adaptive system (Phelan et al., 2011). Therefore, for using 
insurance systems for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change risk which is a global 
phenomenon, international collaboration and commitment are necessary. 
Many vouch for increased government subsidy for agricultural insurance in the 
context of increased agricultural risk due to climate change. However, Mcleman and Smit 
(2006) show that government subsidization of insurance against risks associated with adverse 
climatic conditions and extreme weather events such as flood damage, may lead to individual 
decisions that actually increase the susceptibility of people, property and economic activities 
to these risks. With examples from New Zealand they illustrate how the removal of subsidy 
in crop insurance reduced the moral hazard and farmers took adaptive actions to reduce the 
likelihood of crop losses. Also, removal of subsidy reduced physical hazard, as farmers 
stopped cultivating marginal lands where production risk is more. However, in low-income 
countries, where agriculture is the major source of livelihood of the small farming 
community, subsidy is a requirement to increase the take up of insurance products. Many 
studies on determinants of participation in insurance market reveal that mostly large, wealthy 
and high income farmers buy insurance, whereas small and resource-poor farmers refrain 
 10 
from buying due to their inability to pay the premium (Sherrick et al. 2003; Gine et al. 2008). 
Therefore, in low-income countries, insurance premiums are usually subsidised for marginal 
and small farmers to induce them to busy insurance, which they need most to stabilise their 
income in the event of crop loss. 
3. Climate Change Scenario and Agriculture in Odisha 
Climate change is affecting the global commons adversely. During the past 100 years the 
global mean temperature has increased by 0.74 0 C (IPCC, 2007) and is expected to rise 
between 20 to 40 C during the twenty first century. There are also regional estimations. The 
all-India annual mean surface temperature has increased by 0.510 C in the past 106 years 
(Srinivasan, 2012). There is evidence that extreme rainfall events have increased. During the 
past 100 years, global sea level has increased by around 170 mm. An increase of one metre in 
sea level will inundate almost 6000 km2 land in India. Agricultural production in India will be 
hampered by the rise in temperature, increase in heavy rainfall events, heat waves and coastal 
inundation. 
Kumar and Parikh (2001) have estimated the possible impacts of climate change by 
using climate response function in the ‘best’ guess climate change scenario of a 20 C 
temperature increase and a 7% increase in precipitation. They forecast that for the country as 
a whole, the impacts due to the above scenario are adverse with a loss of about 8.4 per cent of 
the total net-revenue from agriculture. Sanghi and Mendelsohn (2008) estimate that if 
temperatures rise by 20 C with an 8% increase in precipitation, agricultural net revenue may 
fall 12% in India. By using ORYZA1 and INFOCROP rice model, Krishnan et al. (2007) 
predict that for every 1.8 0 C increase in temperature average yield decline will be 6.7% to 
7.2% respectively, at the current level of CO2 (380 ppm) emission. There will be serious 
consequences for food security in India (Fisher et al. 2001). IPCC predicts that crop yields 
could increase up to 20 per cent in East and Southeast Asia while they could decrease up to 
30 per cent in Central and South Asia by 2050.  In tropical countries like India mainly kharif 
rice, sugarcane and wheat yield could decrease due to decline in water availability and rise in 
temperature.  
Climate change is expected to negatively impact agriculture in warmer and lower 
latitude regions including Africa and South Asia. Odisha spreads over geographical area of  
1,55,707 km2, and extends from 17° 49` N to 22° 34`N latitude and from 81° 27` E to 87° 29` 
longitude at the eastern coast of India in South Asia. The state has 480 km long coastline 
along the Bay of Bengal. The state has tropical climate, characterized by high temperature, 
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high humidity, medium to high rainfall and short and mild winters. The temperature remains 
high from March to May and rainfall is high from June to September. Major source of rainfall 
is the south-west monsoon. Besides, the state also receives a small amount of rain from the 
retreating monsoon in the month of October–November, when occasionally cyclone and 
storms are experienced. The annual average rainfall of the state is 1482 mm. Nearly 80 per 
cent of rainfall is received from June to September. There is wide variation in quantum of 
rainfall temporally and spatially. Odisha state as a whole comes under the “Sub humid” 
category, implying deficient winter rains.  
The state is broadly divided into 4 physiographic zones namely Coastal Plains, 
Central Table Land, Northern Plateau and Eastern Ghats. These are further sub-divided into 
10 Agroclimatic Zones. Agricultural Development Indices computed for different districts of 
Odisha indicate that the coastal plain districts are agriculturally more advanced followed by 
the central table land area, eastern ghat and northern plateau in that order (Swain, 2002). 
Agriculture is the backbone of the state contributing to 26 per cent of Net State 
Domestic Product. Nearly 65 per cent of the total work force depends on agriculture to earn 
their livelihood either as cultivators or agricultural labourers. Odisha is the poorest state in 
India having 48 per cent of its population languishing below poverty line. In addition to this, 
due to frequent occurrence of extreme weather events like flood, drought and cyclone the 
incidence of transient poverty is also remarkably high. 
A significant majority of farmers in Odisha mainly depend on rainfall for crop 
cultivation. Irrigation facility has been provided to only 41 per cent of cultivable land. Thus 
59 per cent of cultivable land is rainfed and exposed to the vagaries of monsoon, which cause 
wide variations in crop output.  On the whole, the state’s economy is extremely vulnerable to 
climate change and catastrophic loss because of its tropical climate, monsoon rain, long coast 
line, high dependence on agriculture, mass poverty and low irrigation coverage. 
Going by the key parameters of climate like temperature and rainfall, the climate has 
worsened in Odisha. The manifestations of climate change as observed in Odisha are drier 
weather conditions, extended dry season, early end of rainy season, weak monsoon activity, 
above normal air temperatures (Mujumdar and Ghosh, 2007). The mean maximum 
temperature and the mean minimum temperature of Odisha show an increasing trend. It is 
predicted that for the next two decades there will be warming of about 0.2° C. During dry 
period i.e. September to February rainfall has been decreasing whereas during wet period i.e. 
March to August rainfall has been increasing. As a result there has been an increase in 
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occurrence of drought and flood (Gulati et al., 2009). The average annual normal rainfall 
shows a declining trend.  This has decreased from 1502 mm during 1961-2000 to 1482 mm 
after 2000. The variability of rainfall has increased (Table 1).  
Natural calamities like drought, flood and cyclone occur in the state very frequently. 
During the period 1961-2011, out of a total of 51 years only 11 years were normal years and 
the rest 40 years were abnormal years with occurrence of natural disasters like drought, flood 
and cyclone of varying intensity (Table 1). Coastal districts are prone to floods and cyclones, 
while drought is particularly frequent and severe in the western districts of the state. 
In recent years, an increase in the variability of precipitation, coupled with increase in 
temperature due to global warming, has impacted the hydrological cycle in Odisha. This has 
affected the timing and magnitude of floods, droughts, sediment discharge, and drainage of 
river systems (Mujumdar and Ghosh, 2007); Patra et al., 2012). Global warming has 
increased both coastal and inland flooding. Further it is predicted that lower rainfall and more 
evaporation due to rise in temperature would cause less runoff, which would lead to 
substantial decline in the availability of freshwater in the watersheds, decline of soil moisture 
and increase in aridity level of hydrological zones. These will cause water stress and 
accentuate drought conditions. The increased occurrence of these extreme weather events will 
increase agricultural production risk making the sustenance of farming population quite 
unstable. 
According to Greenpeace (2008), the state’s fluctuating weather conditions observed 
during the last two decades suggest that it is already grappling with climatic chaos. For more 
than a decade now, it has experienced contrasting extreme weather conditions: from heat 
waves to cyclones, from droughts to floods (CSE, 2008). Earlier Western Odisha was a 
known calamity hotspot but now the coastal areas are also experiencing heat waves. A heat 
wave in 1998 killed around 1500 people, mostly in coastal Odisha, a region otherwise known 
for its moderate temperature. Bhubaneswar, the state capital of Odisha now has a mean 
maximum temperature above 40˚ C which is comparable to Sambalpur located in the interior. 
The 2001 flood was the worst ever flood recorded in Odisha in the past century, as 25 of the 
30 districts were inundated affecting one-third of the state’s 30 million residents. Areas with 
no history of floods such as districts in western Odisha were submerged. Ironically, Odisha 
suffered one of its worst droughts in the same year. Due to climate change, the severity of 
cyclone has also increased on the Odisha coast (Swain et al., 2006). In 1999, two cyclones hit 
the state in quick succession. The second one was unparalleled in Indian history and named 
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as Super Cyclone because of amazingly high wind speed of 270-300 km per hour. The super 
cyclone ravaged 12 coastal districts out of total 30 districts of Odisha. Recently, during 11 
October 2013, a severe cyclonic storm named as Phailin created havoc in the state. 
During the last two decades the natural calamities have not only become more 
frequent and severe, but have hit areas that were never considered vulnerable. The state’s 
economy has been ransacked by nature’s fury. The increased frequency, intensity and 
duration of natural calamities have halted the development momentum of the state 
government and the state has been pushed to reverse gear. Particularly the agriculture sector 
has been the worst sufferer. 
Foodgrain production trend in Odisha reveals that large variations in annual rainfall 
and increased frequency of extreme weather events have caused significant instability in crop 
yield and production. Table 2 shows the year wise data on area, yield and production of food 
grains in Odisha for the period from 1970 to 2011. The co-efficient of variation for area, yield 
and production is computed to be 6.9 per cent, 20.2 per cent and 23.9 per cent respectively. 
Thus, the inter-temporal variations in yield and production are considerable. It may be seen 
that in abnormal years the yield has been reduced substantially. During normal years, the 
food grain production hovers around 8 million metric tonne. In the year 1999, when the super 
cyclone had devastated twelve fertile coastal districts of the state, the food grain production 
was only 5.6 million tonne. Likewise in the severe drought year 2002 the food grain 
production declined to an alarmingly low level of 4 million tonne. 
The impacts of climate change on agriculture are largely determined by the ability of 
producers to access irrigation, alternate crop varieties, agronomic practices, explore 
marketing opportunity, insurance and technology, or to discard agriculture for alternate 
livelihoods. If farmers do not take adequate adaptive measures to combat climatic risk, there 
may be substantial decline in crop production, farm income and greater production instability 
and food insecurity.  
4. Modality of Crop Insurance Schemes 
Realising the importance of insurance as a risk management strategy, the Government of 
Odisha has implemented different crop insurance schemes from time to time to stabilize farm 
income and stimulate investment in agriculture (Swain, 2008). To start with Odisha 
experimented by implementing some pilot crop insurance schemes during 1980-85.  After the 
launching of Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme (CCIS) by the Government of India in 
 14 
1985, Odisha immediately implemented the scheme across the state in the same year kharif 
season following guidelines of the Central Government. To reduce administrative costs the 
scheme had a built-in crop insurance to cover farmers who have taken crop loans from 
commercial banks, regional rural banks and the cooperatives. The basic objectives of the 
scheme were (i) to provide a measure of financial support to farmers in the event of crop 
failure as a result of drought, flood etc.; (ii) to restore the credit eligibility of farmers, after a 
crop failure, for the next crop season; and (iii) to support and stimulate production of cereals, 
pulses and oilseeds.  
 In this scheme the indemnification was on area basis and if there was a shortfall in 
actual average yield per hectare of insured crop from the threshold yield, each of the insured 
farmers growing that crop in the defined area was eligible for indemnity. This scheme was a 
credit linked insurance scheme and is criticised as a loan insurance scheme as the scheme was 
compulsory for loanee farmers and not available to non-loanee farmers, who self finance the 
cultivation expenses. Also, the financial performance of the scheme was very poor, as 
premium rates were highly subsidised and the claim-premium ratio was greater than one i.e. 
unfavourable in most of the seasons (Swain, 2008). To improve the scheme performance, a 
broad based National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) has been implemented 
since1999 rabi season. NAIS covered all food crops (cereals, millets and pulses), cotton, 
sugarcane and potato in the 1st year and other annual commercial/horticultural crops in a 
period of three years. All loanee farmers are compulsorily covered under the scheme. The 
non-loanee farmers growing insurable crops can also opt for the scheme. The scheme 
provides comprehensive risk insurance against yield losses due to natural fire, lightening, 
storm, hailstorm, cyclone, typhoon, tempest, hurricane, tornado, flood, inundation and 
landslide, drought, dry spells, pests, diseases etc. The sum insured extends to the value of the 
threshold yield of the crop, with an option to cover up to 150 per cent of average yield of the 
crop on payment of extra premium. The premium rate for kharif crops bajra and oilseeds is 
3.5 per cent of sum insured and 2.0 per cent for other food crops. In the rabi season the 
premium rate is 1.5 per cent for wheat and 2.0 per cent for other food crops and oilseeds. 
Also, 50 per cent subsidy in premium is allowed to small and marginal farmers which will be 
shared equally by the Government of India and State Government/Union Territory. The 
subsidy shall be phased out in a period of 5 years. In Odisha during 2009, the subsidy has 
been reduced to only 10 per cent. Like CCIS, NAIS operates on the basis of area approach. 
However, there is provision that the scheme would operate on individual basis for localized 
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calamities such as hailstorm, landslides, cyclone and flood. NAIS is considered as an 
improvement over CCIS for extending insurance facility to non-loanee farmers, setting higher 
premium and including horticultural and commercial crops. However, NAIS failed to achieve 
its objectives owing to its low coverage, poor financial performance and less effectiveness 
(Sinha, 2004; Vyas and Singh, 2006; Kalavakonda and Mahul, 2005; Raju and Chand, 2008). 
The major drawback of NAIS is delay in payment of compensation as the collection of crop 
yield data through crop cutting experiment is a time consuming process. Moreover, as the 
claims are equally shared by the central and state government on 50:50 basis, the insurance 
company can disburse the compensation only after receiving from the central and state 
government, which cause significant delay in settlement of claims (Mahul et al. 2012).  
To reduce administrative cost of collecting data on yield and to make faster claim 
payment in a transparent manner, during 2007 the Central Government launched Weather 
Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) on pilot basis. Following the guidelines of the 
Central Government, since 2008 Odisha has been implementing WBCIS in few drought 
prone blocks in western Odisha on pilot basis. Initially during 2008, WBCIS was available 
only to non-loanee farmers. Since Kharif 2009, the scheme has been extended to both loanee 
and non-loanee farmers for paddy crop. In the pilot areas, for the loanee farmers, WBCIS is 
compulsory and NAIS is not available to them. But for the non-loanee farmers both NAIS 
and WBCIS are available.  
WBCIS as implemented in Odisha is nothing but rainfall insurance and under this 
scheme the insured farmers shall be compensated against the likelihood of financial loss on 
account of anticipated loss in crop yield resulting from adverse rainfall incidence such as 
deficit rainfall and excess rainfall. In case of adverse weather incidence (AWI), all the 
insured farmers in the reference unit area shall be deemed to have suffered the same level of 
AWI and crop loss, and become eligible for the same level of pay-outs. Thus, in case of 
WBCIS, if there is deficient or excess rainfall in the defined area, all the farmers cultivating 
the notified crop within the defined area will be eligible for compensation at the same rate. 
The premium rate for kharif paddy is 2.5 per cent of sum insured. WBCIS is considered an 
improvement over NAIS because, in comparison to crop yield, rainfall as an index is easier to 
measure objectively and process of data collection is more transparent and less time 
consuming. As a result the administrative cost is low and this facilitates quicker payment of 
indemnity to the buyers of insurance. WBCIS eradicates the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection, as the insured farmer cannot influence the rainfall data to claim higher 
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compensation. WBCIS allows reinsurance by the primary insurer as it is based on 
standardized/well defined internationally verifiable data. Major drawback of WBCIS is that it 
covers only the weather related risk and if there is crop loss due to any other reason such as 
plant disease and pest attack, the insured does not get any compensation. The most 
challenging disadvantage of WBCIS is basis risk, which is the variability between the value 
of losses as measured by the weather index and the value of actual losses experienced on the 
farm (Hess, 2003; Collier et al., 2009). Basis risk results in mismatch between actual loss and 
payout. In WBCIS, the start-up cost is high as, time series and historical data on rainfall and 
yield are required to define the trigger events that necessitate indemnity payment. A 
comparison of the modality of NAIS and WBCIS is given in the following table. 
Comparison between NAIS and WBCIS 
National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (NAIS) 
 
Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme 
(WBCIS) 
Practically all risks covered (drought, excess 
rainfall, flood, hail, pest infestation, plant 
disease etc.) 
Weather related risks like rainfall, frost, 
temperature, humidity etc. are covered.  
 
Easy-to-design if historical yield data up to 
10 years is available 
Technical challenges in designing weather 
indices and also correlating weather indices 
with yield losses. Needs up to 25 years 
historical weather data 
High basis risk [difference between the yield 
of the Area (Block / Tehsil) and the 
individual farmers] 
Basis risk with regard to weather could be high 
for rainfall and moderate for others like frost, 
heat, humidity etc. 
Objectivity and transparency are relatively 
less. 
Objectivity and transparency are relatively high 
Quality losses are beyond consideration. Quality losses to some extent gets reflected 
through weather index 
High loss assessment costs (crop cutting 
experiments) 
No loss assessment costs 
Delays in claims settlement Faster claims settlement 
Government’s financial liabilities are open 
ended, as it supports the claims subsidy. 
Government’s financial liabilities could be 
budgeted up-front and close ended, as it 
supports the premium subsidy. 
   
During 2010 the Government of India also launched a modified National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (MNAIS) on pilot basis in some selected districts across the country. The 
MNAIS tried to correct the loopholes in the existing NAIS. The novel features of MNAIS are 
coverage of prevented sowing/planting risk and post harvest loss, provision of higher level of 
indemnity, provision for mid-season on-account payment of compensation on the basis of 
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expected crop loss, allowing private sector participation. In case of adverse seasonal 
conditions during crop season, claim amount up to 25 percent of likely claims would be 
released in advance subject to adjustment against the claims assessed on yield basis. 
Recently during November 2013, in order to insulate farmers from farming risks, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperation, Government of India has directed the state 
governments to implement the new National Crop Insurance Programme (NCIP) with 
immediate effect from the ongoing rabi season. This central scheme has been formulated by 
merging the Pilot Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS), Pilot Modified National 
Agricultural Insurance Scheme (MNAIS) and Pilot Coconut Palm Insurance Scheme (CPIS) 
to make it more farmer friendly.  
Loanee farmers will be covered compulsorily under component scheme of NCIP 
notified by the concerned state, while non-loanee farmers will choose either MNAIS or 
WBCIS component. MNAIS and WBCIS will be extended to all the districts from rabi 2013-
14 and NAIS will be rolled back simultaneously. Private sector insurers with adequate 
infrastructure and experience will be permitted to implement NCIP besides Agriculture 
Insurance Company of India (AIC).  
Unlike earlier, all farmers even including sharecroppers, tenant farmers, farmers 
enrolled in contract farming, group of farmers serviced by fertilizer companies, pesticide 
firms, crop growers, and self help groups are eligible for insurance cover. There will be three 
indemnity levels instead of two- 70 per cent, 80 per cent and 90 per cent.  The Threshold 
yield (TY) or guaranteed yield for a crop in a Insurance Unit shall be the average yield of the 
preceding 7 years excluding the year(s) in which a natural calamity such as drought, floods 
etc. may have been declared by the concerned Government authority, multiplied by level of 
indemnity. However, it may be ensured that at least 5 years' yield data is available for 
calculating the threshold yield. 
The insurance companies will be liable to make claim payment from their own 
resources. Only the premium subsidy will be shared by state and central government on 50:50 
basis. Besides, a catastrophic fund at the national level will be set up for providing 
reinsurance cover to the insurance companies implementing the scheme. However this fund, 
set up with equal contribution from the state and centre, can be used only in the event of 
failure to procure reinsurance cover at competitive rates and if premium to claims ratio 
exceeds 1:5.  The novelty of the NCIS is that it incentivises risk reducing measures by 
 18 
farmers by lowering the premium for the farmers who undertake soil and water conservation 
measures. Premium structure would be worked out with a discount provision on the premium 
in respect of a unit area where all farmers have adopted better water conservation and 
sustainable farming practices for better risk mitigation.  
In the National Action Plan on Climate Change (2008), under the national mission for 
sustainable agriculture, emphasis has been laid on strengthening agricultural and weather 
based insurance schemes to make agriculture resilient to climatic risk. Odisha is one of the 
first states to formulate its Climate Change Action Plan for 2010-2015. However, in the 
Action Plan, there is no mention about the role of insurance as a risk management strategy.  
5. Performance of Crop Insurance Schemes 
To evaluate the performance of NAIS and WBCIS under implementation in Odisha, I have 
analysed district-wise and state time series data on area and number of farmers covered, 
sum assured, premium collected, claims paid and farmers benefited, which have been 
collected from the regional office of Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, 
Bhubaneswar regional office. Also, I have used the information gathered through focussed 
group discussion with insurance users, while undertaking a research project on crop 
insurance with technical and financial support of South Asian Network for Development 
and Environmental Economics (SANDEE).  
Adoption of NAIS as risk management strategy 
I have tried to examine to what extent the farmers in Odisha have adopted the crop 
insurance schemes as a risk management tool. As NAIS is a universal scheme and under 
implementation in all the districts of Odisha, to examine the extent of farmers’ participation, 
I have considered the trend in area and number of farmers covered under this scheme. Over 
the period 2000-2010, area under NAIS during both the kharif and rabi seasons show more 
or less an increasing trend. This is shown in Table 3 and Figure 1. The total area under 
NAIS has steadily increased from 0.86 million ha in 2000 to 1.06 million ha in 2010. 
However, percentage of Gross Cropped Area under NAIS has marginally increased from 
10.1 per cent in 2000 to 11.7 per cent during 2010 (Table 3). Thus, the penetration of NAIS 
is abysmally low and slow, as nearly 90 per cent of gross cropped area in Odisha is not yet 
covered under NAIS. 
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For loanee farmers, i.e. for the farmers taking loans from institutional sources such 
as commercial banks, cooperatives and regional rural banks, NAIS is compulsory, but for 
non-loanee farmers, it is voluntary. Therefore, a break-up analysis of area and farmers 
covered according to loanee and non-loanee categories has been made to examine the 
farmers’ adoption rate of NAIS voluntarily (Table 4). During 2010 kharif season, it is 
observed that only one per cent of farmers are non-loanees and they account for 1.9 per cent 
of total area under NAIS, which is really worrisome. On the top of it, the trend analysis 
reveals that over the period 2000-2010 kharif seasons, the percentage of non-loanee farmers 
availing NAIS has declined substantially from 11.9 per cent in 2000 to only one per cent in 
2010 (Table 3). Likewise the percentage of area covered by non-loanee farmers has 
declined from 10.5 per cent in 2000 to only 1.9 per cent in 2010. Thus the insurance scheme 
has received scant acceptance by the non-loanee farmers, for whom insurance is voluntary. I 
tried to explore the reasons for such non-adoption of NAIS through focussed group 
discussion with the farmers and implementing agency personnel. It was discerned that the 
cooperatives, regional rural banks and commercial banks extend insurance facility to loanee 
farmers, for whom insurance is compulsory. But they are reluctant to provide insurance 
service to non-loanee farmers due to additional work burden and shortage of manpower. In 
spite of the provision for payment of service charges to the banks for providing crop 
insurance (4% of the premium collected), the bankers complained that they do not get any 
service charges from the Agriculture Insurance Company of India, and also the service 
charge is quite nominal in comparison to the extra work burden of processing insurance 
applications and providing insurance service.. 
Thus the insurance scheme has not received wide acceptance by the non-loanee 
farmers, for whom insurance is voluntary. In the case of rabi season the participation of 
non-loanee farmers is quite negligible and during 2010 it was nil (Table 5). Over the period 
2000-2010 the percentage of non-loanee farmers and percentage of area show a decline 
from 0.7 per cent in 2000 to zero per cent in 2010.  
Thus the adoption rate of NAIS by non-loanee farmers is abysmally low and a 
matter for great concern. A regionwise analysis reveals that the participation of non-loanee 
farmers in NAIS is higher for agriculturally backward regions such as northern plateau and 
central table land area, where agricultural risk is high. The percentage of area covered by 
non-loanee farmers is only 0.3 in the most agriculturally advanced coastal region, whereas it 
is as high as 12 per cent for the most agriculturally backward region of northern plateau. 
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This indicates that in risky areas, the non-loanee farmers are coming forward to insure their 
crops (Table 6). 
Categorywise analysis of adoption of NAIS scheme reveals that marginal and small 
farmers owning land less than two hectares constitute 91% of total loanee farmers and 75 % 
of non-loanee farmers (Table 7). Thus the percentage of other farmers that include the 
medium and large farmers is  higher for non-loanee farmers (25%) than that of loanee 
farmers (9%), which indicate that more of big farmers voluntarily insure their crop.  
NAIS covers various crops during both kharif and rabi season. In Odisha, during  
2009-10 kharif season, out of total insured area of 0.98 million ha, paddy coverage was as 
high as 0.95 million ha, accounting for nearly 97 percent of total cropped area. Other crops 
covered were maize (15276 ha), cotton (8457 ha), ginger (1039 ha), turmeric (767ha) and 
groundnut (140 ha). During rabi season also paddy is the most important insured crop 
(1,12953 ha) followed by groundnut (13611 ha) and potato (8467ha). However, WBCIS 
covers only paddy during kharif season and does not cover any crop during rabi season. 
WBCIS has been designed only for paddy as paddy production crucially depends on 
rainfall. NAIS covers all types of production risk including various natural calamities, pest 
attack and plant diseases, WBCIS covers only crop loss due to rainfall deficit or excess. 
Farmers Benefited under NAIS 
During 2000-2010 kharif seasons, it is observed that the percentage of farmers benefited 
from crop insurance in terms of receiving compensation varies substantially ranging from 
1.7 per cent in 2001 to 69.7 per cent in 2002 (Table 8). During abnormal years of flood and 
drought the number of farmers benefited is very large. During rabi seasons the percentage 
of farmers benefited ranges from zero per cent in the year 2000 to 27.4 per cent in 2009. 
A region wise analysis of percentage of farmers benefited from NAIS during 2009 
kharif season in the case of loanee farmers reveals that it is the highest i.e. 31.3 per cent for 
the agriculturally most backward region of Northern Plateau and the least i.e.0.07 per cent 
for the agriculturally advanced coastal region (Table 9). Similar finding is obtained in the 
case of non-loanee farmers. However, in the case of non-loanee farmers the percentage of 
farmers benefited is higher than that of loanee farmers for the state as a whole and also in 
northern plateau and central table land area. This shows that more of risky farmers 
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voluntarily come forward to insure their crops and thereby get compensation in the event of 
crop failure. 
Financial Performance of NAIS 
To assess the financial performance of NAIS in Odisha, the claim-premium ratio was 
computed by dividing the indemnity claim or compensation payment by insurance premium 
collected. If the claim-premium ratio exceeds one, it indicates financial loss on the part of 
the insurer in insurance business. During the 2000-2009 kharif seasons, it is observed that 
the claim-premium ratio is unfavourable i.e. greater than one for 6 years and favourable for 
only 4 years (Table 10). The claim-premium ratio ranges from 0.15 in 2005 kharif season to 
9.4 in 2000 kharif season. But for 2000-2009 rabi seasons, claim premium is favourable for 
9 years and unfavourable only for one year. 
A region wise analysis of claim-premium ratio unfolds that it is higher in the case of 
agriculturally backward region and for non-loanee farmers (Table 11). There is negative 
association between extent of agricultural development of the region and claim-premium 
ratio. 
Comparison of NAIS and WBCIS Performance 
WBCIS has been implemented in Odisha on pilot basis since 2008 and covers only kharif 
paddy crop. A comparison of performance of NAIS and WBCIS reveals that percentage of 
non-loanee farmers and area covered by non-loanee farmers are higher in case of WBCIS, 
which implies that WBCIS is more popular than NAIS (Table 12). In the case of WBCIS, 
during 2008 the scheme was available to only non-loanee farmers, therefore, all the farmers 
buying insurance were non-loanees. During 2009 and 2010 kharif season, the percentage of 
non-loanee farmers was 8.8 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively (Table 12). Thus the 
percentage of non-loanees is higher in both the years compared to NAIS, which was only 3 
per cent and 1 per cent respectively. Likewise percentage area covered by non-loanees was 
higher in both the years in comparison to NAIS. Thus the adoption rate is higher in WBCIS 
than NAIS, because of its transparency and quicker payment of indemnity. The claim-
premium ratio is also higher in case of WBCIS indicating more compensation payment to 
insurance users in comparison to their premium payment.  
Percentage of farmers benefited was quite higher for WBCIS than that of NAIS. For 
NAIS, it ranged from only 9.1 per cent in 2008 to 19.3 in 2010. In case of WBCIS it ranged 
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from 18.6 per cent in 2010 to cent per cent in 2008 (Table 13). The premium paid per 
hectare was higher in case of NAIS in comparison to WBCIS.  It is observed that insured 
area per farmer was higher in case of WBCIS in comparison to NAIS for all the kharif 
seasons. However, the sum assured per hectare was more in the case of NAIS. 
Thus, WBCIS seems to perform better than NAIS because of more coverage, higher 
percentage of non-loanee farmers, higher percentage of farmers benefited, less premium and 
higher claim-premium ratio (Table 13). However, as we have analysed data only for three 
years, the findings are not conclusive and may be considered as indicative. To further 
investigate the matter; during field survey we have examined the farmers’ views on the 
efficacy of both the schemes. While discussing with the insurance users, they  articulated that 
the frequency of getting compensation is more in the case of WBCIS but the compensation 
amount is greater in the case of NAIS. The farmers expressed that since last 8 years, most of 
the farmers in the region did not get any indemnity under NAIS, whereas most of the farmers 
under WBCIS, received compensation twice since 2009. 
 
6.  Revamping Crop Insurance Schemes 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion in the preceding sections, the followings suggestions 
are made to revamp the existing crop insurance schemes in Odisha in Eastern India to 
increase its operational efficiency and effectiveness as a risk management strategy in the 
context of increasing agricultural risk due to climate change. 
  
Promotion of Crop Insurance as a Merit Good 
To increase the adoption rate of crop insurance the government has a major role to play. 
Insurance may be considered as a merit good as it stabilises farm income and provides 
economic support to farmers in the event of crop loss due to occurrence of unforeseen 
contingencies such as natural calamities, pest attack and plant diseases, which are non-
preventable risks. Recently, widespread suicides by farmers in India speak of the disastrous 
consequences of agricultural risks on farmers’ lives and well being. The government has to 
rise to the occasion and find a market based solution to this socio-economic problem by 
developing credit and insurance markets. Various insurance products catering to the need of 
different crops, locations and varied risk factors may be provided. Government is required to 
promote crop insurance by various methods such as creating awareness about the merits of 
insurance, linking credit with insurance, tying up insurance with other input supply services 
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(seed, fertiliser, irrigation), subsidising insurance and providing reinsurance facility and 
technical assistance. Also data system on rainfall and yield should be developed to help in 
designing insurance products. Research on agro-meteorological issues such as correlation 
between various weather parameters and crop yield in different agro-climatic regions should 
be encouraged, which will help in designing appropriate weather based crop insurance 
products. An enabling   regulatory and legal environment should be created to promote crop 
insurance. 
 
Participatory design of Insurance Products 
In case of WBCIS, the design of insurance product is a very difficult and cumbersome 
process. For defining the trigger events for crop loss, local knowledge and experience are 
very much necessary. The product will vary according to crop, seed variety, soil-climatic 
condition and micro-environment. In such case the design of the product should be done in a 
participatory manner by taking into account the views of the progressive or contact farmers in 
the area. So that farmers will not resist the schemes, if the indemnity payment does not match 
their crop loss. 
The main drawback of NAIS is delay in compensation payment, because collection of 
data on area yield rate on the basis of which compensation will be calculated is a time 
consuming process. Government is required to streamline the procedure and make it 
transparent to reduce the scope for manipulation. The farmers’ representatives should remain 
present during the crop-cutting experiments and estimation of crop yield to win the trust of 
the farmers in the yield data on the basis of which the indemnity will be paid to them in case 
of crop failure. 
 
Integration of NAIS and WBCIS 
NAIS is a multi-peril area based crop yield insurance scheme and it covers not only weather 
related risk such as drought, flood, storm etc. but also plant diseases and pest attack. 
Compensation is paid on the basis of actual crop loss in the defined area. The major 
drawback of this scheme is delay in claim settlement due to time consuming process of 
collection of yield data. 
On the other hand, WBCIS covers only rainfall related risk and the compensation is 
paid on the basis of deficit or excess rainfall which is considered as a correlate or proxy of 
crop loss. The indemnity is paid quickly after receiving the rainfall data from meteorological 
stations. However, in the case of WBCIS, the basis risk is high if there are factors other than 
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rainfall that affect crop yield, faulty design of the product in defining the trigger event and 
inaccurate measurement of local rainfall due to distant location of the weather measuring 
device.  
Therefore, both the schemes have advantages and disadvantages. The better option 
may be to integrate both the schemes to take advantage of merits of both. To remove the basis 
risk, the indemnity may be calculated on the basis of actual crop loss data. However, to save 
delay in payment to wait for yield data after harvest, payout may be made on the basis of 
indemnity calculated by using rainfall data and the remaining amount may be released on the 
basis of actual crop loss data. Recently launched National Crop Insurance Programme  
(NCIP) includes both the schemes as alternatives, but what I am suggesting is to blend both 
the schemes and provide a hybrid insurance product to improve its operational efficiency. 
This insight was gained during my field survey, when most of the NAIS users in the study 
area showed their preference for WBCIS and the WBCIS users revealed their liking for 
NAIS.  
 
Public and Private Participation 
 
The new NCIP has allowed private insurance companies to participate in NAIS as well as 
WBCIS. In the context of climate change with increased covariate catastrophic risk, the 
private companies may not show their interest in offering crop insurance. Therefore, it is 
necessary to make it mandatory for all private and public insurance companies to extend 
certain percentage of their insurance business to cover crop insurance. Like priority lending 
to agriculture sector, insurance companies may be asked to provide priority insurance 
services to agriculture sector and this may be considered as social responsibility of the 
insurance sector. The public sector may address catastrophic risk and provide multi-peril 
insurance where subsidy requirement is high, but allow private sector to provide insurance 
products for less severe events and for individual independent idiosyncratic and localized 
risk. Government should provide technical guidance, subsidy, guarantee and reinsurance 
facility to attract the private insurers to this important sector (Marcel et al. 2002). Regulation 
and strict scrutiny of activities of private insurance companies may be done by the regulatory 
authority. There should be proper mechanism for redressal of grievances of insurance 
users/buyers/adopters. 
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Financing of Insurance and Reinsurance 
Many argue that in the face of limited resources, government has to allocate resources to 
productive and income raising activities like irrigation, rural infrastructure, instead of 
pumping money to insurance which is so to say an income transfer mechanism. However, 
insurance induces farmers to adopt modern method of production, apply fertiliser, cultivate 
HYV seeds and more importantly makes agriculture dependable. To make agriculture viable 
and a cherished occupation, actions on all fronts and an integrated approach is necessary. 
Moreover, to make insurance business viable, reinsurance facility may be provided at state, 
country and international level. In the NCIP, there is a provision for creation of Insurance 
Fund at the centre with 50:50 contributions from centre and state. However, the international 
reinsurance companies have a larger role to play. In the climate change scenario, they also 
face resource constraint and insolvency. Therefore, there is a need for common commitment 
at the international level to meet such eventualities. This has already been accepted by 
UNFCCC and Kyoto protocol.  
 
Role of Insurance in Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation 
 The insurance industry can help both in mitigation and adaptation to climate change by 
inducing proper proactive and reactive responses in insurance users. The mitigation responses 
include incentivising use of clean technology, climate friendly cropping pattern, promoting 
organic farming and less energy intensive agriculture. Proactive adaptation responses include 
encouraging cultivation of drought resistant variety crops and seed variety, pest management, 
seed treatment, using efficient irrigation method etc. Discount in premium may be given for 
taking risk reducing action such as water conservation and sustainable farming practices. The 
insurance industry can induce desirable reactive responses after the occurrence of crop loss 
by making quick payment of indemnity, so that insurance buyers do not deplete their 
productive assets and fall into poverty trap. Also mid-season payment may be made if there is 
clear indication of ultimate crop loss due to severe drought condition or excess rainfall at 
crucial growth stage of crop.   
 
Integration of Microfinance and Microinsurance 
When formal financial institutions like commercial banks, regional rural banks and 
cooperatives did not come forward to meet the credit needs of the poor in rural areas due to 
high transaction cost, the microfinance institutions (MFIs) through the formation of self-help 
groups and group lending came forward to provide credit to the rural poor. Likewise, now 
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there is a need to create awareness about the benefits of insurance in rural areas and the MFIs 
can play a major role in this due to their easy access to farmers through their grass-root level 
developmental activities. The micro-enterprise activities financed through MFIs can be 
insured, and will help in proactively managing enterprise loss. Integration of micro-finance, 
micro-insurance and micro-enterprise will go a long way in solving the problem of 
unemployment and poverty in rural areas. 
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Table 1 
                                                    Rainfall and Natural Calamities in Odisha                  (in mm)                                       
Year Normal Rainfall Actual Rainfall Deviation from normal  in mm in %      Natural Calamity 
1961 1482.2 1262.8 -219.4 -14.8  
1962 1482.2 1269.9 -212.3 -14.3  
1963 1482.2 1467.0 -15.2 -1.0  
1964 1482.2 1414.1 -68.1 -4.6  1965 1482.2 997.1 -485.1 -32.7 Severe Drought 
1966 1482.2 1134.9 -347.3 -23.4 Drought 
1967 1482.2 1326.7 -155.5 -10.5 Cyclone, Flood 
1968 1482.2 1296.1 -186.1 -12.6 Cyclone, Flood 
1969 1482.2 1802.1 319.9 21.6 Flood 
1970 1482.2 1660.2 178.0 12.0 Flood 
1971 1482.2 1791.5 309.3 20.9 Severe Cyclone, Flood 
1972 1482.2 1177.1 -305.1 -20.6 Flood, Drought 
1973 1482.2 1360.1 -122.1 -8.2 Flood 
1974 1482.2 951.2 -531.0 -35.8 Severe Drought, Flood 
1975 1482.2 1325.6 -156.6 -10.6 Flood 
1976 1482.2 1012.5 -469.7 -31.7 Severe Drought 
1977 1482.2 1327.5 -154.7 -10.4 Flood 
1978 1482.2 1333.2 -149.0 -10.1 Hailstorm, Tornados 
1979 1482.2 951.2 -531.0 -35.8 Severe Drought 
1980 1482.2 1318.2 -164.0 -11.1 Flood, Drought 
1981 1482.2 1185.1 -297.1 -20.0 Severe Flood, Drought & Cyclone 
1982 1482.2 1178.3 -303.9 -20.5 Severe Flood, Drought & Cyclone 
1983 1482.2 1374.1 -108.1 -7.3  
1984 1482.2 1303.1 -179.1 -12.1 Drought 
1985 1482.2 1606.8 124.6 8.4 Flood 
1986 1482.2 1547.9 65.7 4.4  
1987 1482.2 1040.4 -441.8 -29.8 Severe Drought 
1988 1482.2 1270.5 -211.7 -14.3  
1989 1482.2 1283.9 -198.3 -13.4  
1990 1482.2 1865.8 383.6 25.9 Flood 
1991 1482.2 1462.2 -20.0 -1.3  
1992 1482.2 1344.1 -138.1 -9.3 Flood & Drought 
1993 1482.2 1417.6 -64.6 -4.4  
1994 1482.2 1700.3 218.1 14.7  
1995 1482.2 1600.4 118.2 8.0 Flood & Cyclone 
1996 1482.2 988.9 -493.3 -33.3 Drought 
1997 1482.2 1463.0 -19.2 -1.3 Drought 
1998 1482.2 1279.6 -202.6 -13.7 Drought, Heat Wave 
1999 1482.2 1433.8 -48.4 -3.3 Super Cyclone 
2000 1482.2 1022.9 -459.3 -31.0 Drought  
2001 1482.2 1616.2 134.0 9.0 Flood 
2002 1482.2 1005.5 -476.7 -32.2 Severe Drought 
2003 1482.2 1667.1 184.9 12.5 Flood 
2004 1482.2 1273.6 -208.6 -14.1 Flood 
2005 1451.2 1515.8 64.6 4.5 Flood 
2006 1451.2 1682.8 231.6 16.0 Flood 
2007 1451.2 1591.6 140.4 9.7 Flood 
2008 1451.2 1523.6 72.4 5.0 Flood 
2009 1451.2 1362.6 -88.6 -6.1 Flood & Drought 
2010 1451.2 1293.1 -158.1 -10.9 Flood & Drought 
2011 1451.2 1338.1 -113.1 -7.8 Flood 
Mean   1361.1       
SD  231.9    
CV(in %)  17.0    
Source: Climatological Data of Orissa, Various Issues, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Orissa, Bhubaneswar. 
              Orissa Agriculture Statistics, Various Issues, Directorate of Agriculture and Food Production, Orissa, Bhubaneswar. 
              Annual Report on Natural Calamity 2009-10, Revenue & Disaster Management Department, Orissa. 
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Table 2: Area, Yield and Production of Foodgrains in Odisha 
Year Area (000Ha) Yield (Kg/Ha) Production (000MT)        Natural Calamity 
1970-71 5781 847 5104 Flood 
1971-72 5950 732 4354 Severe Cyclone, Flood 
1972-73 5915 822 4860 Flood, Drought 
1973-74 6218 84 8 5480 Flood 
1974-75 5992 663 3971 Severe Drought, Flood 
1975-76 6484 859 5500 Flood 
1976-77 6038 675 4075 Severe Drought 
1977-78 6519 853 5561 Flood 
1978-79 6680 863 5765 Hailstorm, Tornados 
1979-80 6455 600 3872 Severe Drought 
1980-81 6909 865 5977 Flood, Drought 
1981-82 6738 822 5538 Severe Flood, Drought & Cyclone 
1982-83 6417 731 4688 Severe Flood & Drought, Cyclone 
1983-84 7323 956 7001  
1984-85 6652 843 5609 Drought 
1985-86 7043 989 6968 Flood 
1986-87 7010 910 6378  
1987-88 6728 751 5058 Severe Drought 
1988-89 6856 1021 7002  
1989-90 6972 1144 7974  
1990-91 7089 992 7031 Flood 
1991-92 7252 1141 8273  
1992-93 6946 993 6898 Flood & Drought 
1993-94 7208 1140 8216  
1994-95 7120 1122 7986  
1995-96 7194 1101 7923 Flood & Cyclone 
1996-97 6360 841 5347 Drought 
1997-98 6616 1105 7311 Drought 
1998-99 6516 989 6288 Drought, Heat Wave 
1999-00 6075 937 5602 Super Cyclone 
2000-01 5192 884 4976 Drought  
2001-02 6683 1232 8233 Flood 
2002-03 5992 675 4045 Severe Drought 
2003-04 6568 1178 7737 Flood 
2004-05 6576 1154 7588 Flood 
2005-06 6790 1211 8221 Flood 
2006-07 6840 1213 8298 Flood 
2007-08 6884 1344 9254 Flood 
2008-09 6912 1249 8634 Flood 
2009-10 6920 1258 8707 Flood & Drought 
2010-11 6783 1293 8770 Flood & Drought 
2011-12 6483 1175 7616 Flood 
S.D 457.8 197.1 1557.1 
 C.V. (%) 6.9 20.2 23.9  
Source: Orissa Agriculture Statistics, Various Issues, Directorate of Agriculture and Food Production, Orissa, Bhubaneswar. 
              Annual Report on Natural Calamity 2009-10, Revenue & Disaster Management Department, Orissa. 
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           Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office,    
            Bhubaneswar, Odisha. 
      Orissa Agricultural Statistics, Various issues and Directorate of  
      Agriculture and Food Production, Odisha, Bhubaneswar. 
             
 
  
  
   Table 3   
Percentage of Gross Cropped Area  under NAIS in Odisha  
Kharif and Rabi 2000-2010 
                                                                                                            (Area in Ha) 
  Area under NAIS  
Year G.C.A. Kharif Area   Rabi Area  Total Area  
% of G.C.A.  
under NAIS 
2000 8526000 751595 164703 916298 10.1 
2001 7877000 625098 108810 733908 10.2 
2002 8798000 1377756 174899 1552655 17.1 
2003 7852000 633977 123475 757452 10.3 
2004 8638000 943212 178181 1121393 13.2 
2005 8718000 922854 198026 1120880 13.1 
2006 8928000 890122 216780 1106902 12.2 
2007 8960000 905934 199725 1105659 11.7 
2008 9014000 590932 138534 729466 8.2 
2009 9071000 981287 144564 1125851 12.3 
2010 9075000 1031185 31705 1062890 11.7 
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   Table 4    
Percentage Distribution of Farmers and Area Covered 
 according to Loanee and Non-Loanee category 
NAIS Kharif 2000-2010  
Season % of Farmers % of Area  
   Loanee Farmers        
 Non-
Loanee 
Farmers          
 Total  Loanee Farmers             
 Non-
Loanee 
Farmers          
 Total 
Kharif-2000 88.1 11.9 100 89.5 10.5 100 
Kharif-2001 89.6 10.4 100 90.6 9.4 100 
Kharif-2002 54.4 45.6 100 53.2 46.8 100 
Kharif-2003 96.2 3.8 100 94.8 5.2 100 
Kharif-2004 88.7 11.3 100 85.3 14.7 100 
Kharif-2005 99.1 0.9 100 98.4 1.6 100 
Kharif-2006 98.4 1.6 100 97.4 2.6 100 
Kharif-2007 99.5 0.5 100 99.2 0.8 100 
Kharif-2008 97.4 2.6 100 95.5 4.5 100 
Kharif-2009 97.0 3.0 100 94.6 5.4 100 
Kharif-2010 99.0 1.0 100 98.1 1.9 100 
 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, 
Bhubaneswar, Odisha 
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Table 5 
Percentage Distribution of Farmers and Area Covered  
according to Loanee and Non-Loanee category 
NAIS Rabi 2000-2010 
Season % of Farmers % of Area   
  
 Loanee 
Farmers         
 Non-
Loanee 
Farmers          
 Total  Loanee Farmers             
 Non-
Loanee 
Farmers          
 Total 
Rabi-2000 99.3 0.7 100 99.3 0.7 100 
Rabi-2001 99.7 0.3 100 99.8 0.2 100 
Rabi-2002 99.7 0.3 100 99.9 0.1 100 
Rabi-2003 100 0.0 100 100 0.0 100 
Rabi-2004 100 0.0 100 100 0.0 100 
Rabi-2005 100 0.0 100 100 0.0 100 
Rabi-2006 100 0.0 100 100 0.0 100 
Rabi-2007 99.9 0.1 100 100 0.0 100 
Rabi-2008 99.9 0.1 100 99.8 0.2 100 
Rabi-2009 100 0.0 100 100 0.0 100 
Rabi-2010 100 0.0 100 100 0.0 100 
    Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar,   
                 Odisha 
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Table 6 
Percentage  Distribution of Farmers and Area Covered  
according to Loanee and Non-Loanee category 
 Region and District-wise NAIS Kharif 2009-2010 
Region % of Farmers % of Area  
  
 Loanee 
Farmers       
 Non-
Loanee 
Farmers          
 Total  Loanee Farmers             
 Non-
Loanee 
Farmers          
 Total 
Northern Plateau            
Mayurbhanj 99.7 0.3 100.0 99.8 0.2 100.0 
Keonjhar 96.4 3.6 100.0 94.0 6.0 100.0 
Sundargarh 84.8 15.2 100.0 74.5 25.5 100.0 
Jharsuguda 94.6 5.4 100.0 90.1 9.9 100.0 
Deogarh 97.1 2.9 100.0 92.6 7.4 100.0 
Total 92.1 7.9 100.0 87.2 12.8 100.0 
Central Table 
Land           
Bolangir 95.1 4.9 100.0 92.2 7.8 100.0 
Sambalpur 92.8 7.2 100.0 86.5 13.5 100.0 
Bargarh 86.0 14.0 100.0 74.5 25.5 100.0 
Dhenkanal 99.0 1.0 100.0 98.9 1.1 100.0 
Sonepur 88.3 11.7 100.0 85.0 15.0 100.0 
Angul 94.7 5.3 100.0 95.1 4.9 100.0 
Boudh 99.3 0.7 100.0 98.5 1.5 100.0 
Nawapara 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 93.5 6.5 100.0 89.5 10.5 100.0 
Eastern Ghat           
Koraput 99.4 0.6 100.0 98.6 1.4 100.0 
Kalahandi 97.2 2.8 100.0 96.4 3.6 100.0 
Phulbani 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Rayagada 99.9 0.1 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Gajapati 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Nowrangpur 99.9 0.1 100.0 99.7 0.3 100.0 
Malkanagiri 99.8 0.2 100.0 99.8 0.2 100.0 
Total 99.0 1.0 100.0 98.4 1.6 100.0 
Coastal Plain           
Balasore 99.8 0.2 100.0 99.8 0.2 100.0 
Cuttack 99.3 0.7 100.0 98.9 1.1 100.0 
Puri 100.0 0.0 100.0 99.8 0.2 100.0 
Ganjam 99.9 0.1 100.0 99.7 0.3 100.0 
Bhadrak 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Jajpur 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Jagatsinghpur 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Kendrapara 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Khurda 99.4 0.6 100.0 99.6 0.4 100.0 
Nayagarh 99.3 0.7 100.0 98.6 1.4 100.0 
Total 99.8 0.2 100.0 99.7 0.3 100.0 
                            Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar, Odisha 
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Table 7 
Percentage Distribution of Different Categories of Farmers according to Loanee and Non-Loanee category 
Region and District-wise  Kharif 2009-2010 
Region % of Farmers % of Area  
  Loanee Non-Loanee Loanee Non-Loanee 
  S/M Others Total S/M Others Total S/M Others Total S/M Others  
Northern Plateau                         
Mayurbhanj 92.4 7.6 100.0 91.9 8.1 100.0 81.6 18.4 100 75.5 24.5  
Keonjhar 98.8 1.2 100.0 96.0 4.0 100.0 95.2 4.8 100 87.7 12.3  
Sundargarh 91.7 8.3 100.0 88.4 11.6 100.0 86.2 13.8 100 77.0 23.0  
Jharsuguda 81.6 18.4 100.0 52.4 47.6 100.0 64.6 35.4 100 30.5 69.5  
Deogarh 88.4 11.6 100.0 53.7 46.3 100.0 72.6 27.4 100 31.3 68.7  
Total 93.3 6.7 100.0 87.1 12.9 100.0 84.9 15.1 100 73.6 26.4  
Central Table 
Land             
Bolangir 85.1 14.9 100.0 67.6 32.4 100.0 73.1 26.9 100 46.4 53.6  
Sambalpur 67.2 32.8 100.0 45.3 54.7 100.0 47.3 52.7 100 21.8 78.2  
Bargarh 74.0 26.0 100.0 36.7 63.3 100.0 57.3 42.7 100 18.4 81.6  
Dhenkanal 98.8 1.2 100.0 94.1 5.9 100.0 96.8 3.2 100 86.8 13.2  
Sonepur 82.4 17.6 100.0 79.8 20.2 100.0 64.3 35.7 100 58.1 41.9  
Angul 99.1 0.9 100.0 94.1 5.9 100.0 97.5 2.5 100 89.5 10.5  
Boudh 91.7 8.3 100.0 68.1 31.9 100.0 79.1 20.9 100 40.6 59.4  
Nawapara 0.0 100.0 100.0 64.9 35.1 100.0 0.0 100.0 100 38.5 61.5  
Total 87.9 12.1 100.0 65.2 34.9 100.0 76.4 23.6 100 38.9 61.1  
Eastern Ghat             
Koraput 87.8 12.2 100.0 62.1 37.9 100.0 69.8 30.2 100 23.7 76.3  
Kalahandi 69.6 30.4 100.0 57.3 42.7 100.0 46.4 53.6 100 26.9 73.1  
Phulbani 97.9 2.1 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.5 10.5 100 0.0 0.0  
Rayagada 71.7 28.3 100.0 40.0 60.0 100.0 51.1 48.9 100 31.1 47.1  
Gajapati 97.3 2.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 92.4 7.6 100 0.0 0.0  
Nowrangpur 94.4 5.6 100.0 65.9 34.1 100.0 84.5 15.5 100 32.6 67.4  
Malkanagiri 96.8 3.2 100.0 65.5 34.5 100.0 93.0 7.0 100 73.6 26.4  
Total 83.1 16.9 100.0 57.9 42.1 100.0 64.2 35.8 100 27.3 72.6  
Coastal Plain             
Balasore 99.2 0.8 100.0 95.6 4.4 100.0 97.9 2.1 100 83.3 16.7  
Cuttack 99.6 0.4 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 98.5 1.5 100 100.0 0.0  
Puri 99.0 1.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 95.9 4.1 100 0.0 100.0  
Ganjam 97.4 2.6 100.0 46.6 53.4 100.0 92.8 7.2 100 20.8 79.2  
Bhadrak 99.5 0.5 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 97.8 2.2 100 0.0 0.0  
Jajpur 99.2 0.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 94.5 5.5 100 0.0 0.0  
Jagatsinghpur 99.2 0.8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 96.3 3.7 100 0.0 0.0  
Kendrapara 99.8 0.2 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 98.7 1.3 100 0.0 0.0  
Khurda 99.2 0.8 100.0 98.6 1.4 100.0 97.6 2.4 100 95.3 4.7  
Nayagarh 98.7 1.3 100.0 90.8 9.2 100.0 95.7 4.3 100 70.3 29.7  
Total 99.0 1.0 100.0 91.6 8.4 100.0 96.4 3.6 100 70.5 29.5  
State Total 90.8 9.2 100.0 75.4 24.6 100.0 80.5 19.5 100.0 52.6 47.4  
 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar, Odisha 
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   Table 8    
Percentage of  Farmers Benefited under NAIS  
Kharif and Rabi 2000-2010 
Year   Kharif     Rabi   
  Farmers Covered 
Farmers 
Benefited 
Percentage 
of Farmers 
Benefited 
Farmers 
Covered 
Farmers 
Benefited 
Percentage 
of Farmers 
Benefited 
2000  681010 349406 51.3 232836       15 0.0 
2001  627568   10854 1.7 123964 25759 20.8 
2002 1204849 839345 69.7 212162 18541 8.7 
2003  638303   38188 6.0 142871 16806 11.8 
2004  872551   45657 5.2 202699   1335 0.7 
2005  900022   19352 2.2 210853   7451 3.5 
2006  880330   68532 7.8 230039   7039 3.1 
2007  840727   65885 7.8 199886      19541 9.8 
2008  611477   55928 9.1 132418    964 0.7 
2009 1068687   99184 9.3 161720 44323 27.4 
2010 1107710 213325 19.3 34676 2941 8.5 
 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office,   
              Bhubaneswar,  Odisha. 
 
Table 9 
Regionwise Farmers Benefited under NAIS  
Kharif 2009-2010 
Region   Loanee Non-Loanee 
  
Rank in 
Agril 
Dev 
No. of 
Loanee 
Farmers 
No.of 
Farmers 
Benefited 
% of 
Total  
No. of 
Non-
Loanee 
farmers 
No.of 
Farmers 
Benefited 
% of 
Total  
Northern Plateau 
 
4 156252 48903 31.3 13408 10555 78.7 
Central Table Land 
 
2 245639 29196 11.9 16951 3309 19.5 
Eastern Ghat 
 
3 139211 6812 4.9 1391 35 2.5 
Coastal Plain 
 
1 494997 374 0.1 838 0 0.0 
State Total 
 
1036099 85285 8.2 32588 13899 42.7 
 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar, Odisha 
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   Table 10    
Claim-Premium Ratio under NAIS Kharif and Rabi from 2000-2009 
Year   Kharif      Rabi   
  Premium (Rs.) Claims  (Rs.) 
Claim/ 
Premium 
Premium 
(Rs.) 
Claims 
(Rs.) 
Claim/ 
Premium 
2000 112392562 1054716278 9.38 22844642 16556 0.01 
2001 102218804 23401452 0.23 18561159 14494434 0.78 
2002 298560969 2440291965 8.17 33184437 10819387 0.33 
2003 138160518 181844628 1.32 25437944 11741081 0.46 
2004 254954481 146885827 0.58 33678681 981629 0.03 
2005 243334143 37382700 0.15 49858874 3593957 0.07 
2006 275039791 274771560 1.00 57848102 22079443 0.38 
2007 282415471 240172446 0.85 52583352 41629009 0.79 
2008 217694400 303489566 1.39 38119451 1703855 0.04 
2009 396960881 469004449 1.18 49783305 83697450 1.68 
2010 470714428 1375082096 2.90 42429399 9912081 0.50 
 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, 
              Bhubaneswar, Odisha 
 
   Table 11    
Regionwise Claim Premium Ratio under NAIS  
Kharif 2009-2010 
Region Loanee Non-Loanee 
  
Premium 
(Rs.) 
Claims 
(Rs.) 
Claim-
Premium 
Ratio 
Premium 
(Rs.) 
Claims 
(Rs.) 
Claim-
Premium 
Ratio 
Northern Plateau 49925083 226124293 4.53 4073856 47700491 11.71 
Central Table Land 105381168 159329369 1.51 13085837 23156777 1.77 
Eastern Ghat 55077045 12010752 0.21 727688 1180 0.002 
Coastal Plain 168389711 681586 0.004 28228034 46315914 1.04 
State Total 657695848 344043414 0.52 28228034 46315914 1.64 
 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar,    
             Odisha 
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Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar,  
             Odisha 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
        Distribution of Farmers and Area Covered according to Loanee and Non-Loanee category  
Under NAIS and WBCIS during  Kharif 2008-2010 
Season 
No. of 
Loanee 
Farmers 
% of 
Total 
No. of 
Non- 
Loanee 
Farmers 
% of 
Total Total 
Area of 
Loanee 
Farmers 
(ha) 
% of 
Total 
Area of   
Non-
Loanee 
Farmers 
(ha) 
% of 
Total Total 
NAIS           
2008 595858 97.4 15619 2.6 611477 564402 95.5 26530 4.5 590932 
2009 1036099 97.0 32588 3.0 1068687 928301 94.6 52986 5.4 981287 
2010 1096604 99.0 11106 1.0 1107710 1011782 98.1 19403 1.9 1031185 
           
WBCIS           
2008 0.0 0.0 13289 100.0 13289 0.0 0.0 22278 100.0 22278 
2009 74283 91.2 7146 8.8 81429 97332 85.9 15934 14.1 113266 
2010 72557 97.1 2177 2.9 74734 95877 94.3 5841 5.7 101718 
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Table 13 
Performance Indicators of NAIS and WBCIS (Kharif 2008-2010) 
Season 
Area 
Insured 
(Ha/Farmer) 
Sum 
Assured   
(Rs/Ha) 
% of 
Farmers 
Benefited 
Premium 
Paid 
(Rs/Ha) 
Claim Received 
(Rs/Ha) 
Claim/  
Premium 
NAIS             
2008 1.0 14235 9.1 368 514 1.4 
2009 0.9 16054 9.3 405 478 1.2 
2010 0.9 18161 19.3 456 1333 2.9 
WBCIS             
2008 1.7 20000 100.0 500* 1862 3.7 
2009 1.4 12000 67.3 300* 662 2.2 
2010 1.4 12000 18.6 300* 123 0.4 
 
Note: * These are subsidised premium calculated at 2.5% of sum assured.    
             The gross premium is 10% of sum assured and Rs.2000 in 2008 and  
             Rs.1200 during 2009 and 2010. 
Source: Agriculture Insurance Company of India Limited, Regional Office, Bhubaneswar, 
             Odisha. 
 
